Editorial Reviews:
Product Description
This digital document is a journal article from Transportation Research Part A, published by Elsevier in . The article is delivered in HTML format and is available in your Amazon.com Media Library immediately after purchase. You can view it with any web browser.
Description:
This paper develops congestion theory and congestion pricing theory from its micro-foundations, the interaction of two or more vehicles. Using game theory, with a two-player game it is shown that the emergence of congestion depends on the players' relative valuations of early arrival, late arrival, and journey delay. Congestion pricing can be used as a cooperation mechanism to minimize total costs (if returned to the players). The analysis is then extended to the case of the three-player game, which illustrates congestion as a negative externality imposed on players who do not themselves contribute to it.
|
![Micro-foundations of congestion and pricing: A game theory perspective [An article from: Transportation Research Part A]](http://ecx.images-amazon.com/images/I/41FQD7REY6L._SL160_.jpg)
