Nash equilibria in a model of multiproduct price competition: an assignment problem [An article from: Journal of Mathematical Economics] | ![Nash equilibria in a model of multiproduct price competition: an assignment problem [An article from: Journal of Mathematical Economics]](http://ecx.images-amazon.com/images/I/51G1ZN30ZNL._SL160_.jpg)
 enlarge | Authors: I. Arribas, A. Urbano
Publisher: Elsevier
Category: Book
Buy New: $10.95
Format: Html
Media: Digital
Publication Date: April 1, 2005
Availability: Available for download now
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Product Description
This digital document is a journal article from Journal of Mathematical Economics, published by Elsevier in 2005. The article is delivered in HTML format and is available in your Amazon.com Media Library immediately after purchase. You can view it with any web browser.
Description:
We study the market interaction of a finite number of single-product firms and a representative buyer, where the buyer consumes bundles of these goods. The buyers' value function determines their willingness to pay for subsets of goods. We show that Nash-equilibrium outcomes are solutions of the linear relaxation of an integer programming assignment problem and that they always exist. The Nash-equilibrium price set is characterized by the Pareto frontier of the associated dual problem's projection on the firms' price vectors. We identify the Nash-equilibrium prices for monotonic buyers' value functions and, more importantly, we show that some central solution concepts in cooperative game theory are (subgame perfect) equilibrium prices of our strategic game.
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