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Separating signaling equilibria under random relations between costs and attributes: discrete attributes [An article from: Mathematical Social Sciences] | ![Separating signaling equilibria under random relations between costs and attributes: discrete attributes [An article from: Mathematical Social Sciences]](http://ecx.images-amazon.com/images/I/512S1GNR6ML._SL160_.jpg)
 enlarge | Author: D. Feldman
Publisher: Elsevier
Category: Book
Buy New: $8.95
Format: Html
Media: Digital
Publication Date: July 1, 2004
Availability: Available for download now
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Product Description
This digital document is a journal article from Mathematical Social Sciences, published by Elsevier in 2004. The article is delivered in HTML format and is available in your Amazon.com Media Library immediately after purchase. You can view it with any web browser.
Description:
We identify conditions for separating signaling equilibria where discrete attributes are randomly related to a continuum of costs. A necessary condition is the ordering of the cost distributions conditional on attributes by first order stochastic dominance. A necessary and sufficient condition is the ordering of the cost distributions conditional on attributes by the monotone likelihood ratio property. An equivalent necessary and sufficient condition is the monotone ordering of the cost elasticities of these distributions.
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