Tragedy of Great Power Politics

That said, Mearsheimer's book is well-written and essential reading if one wishes to have a balanced view of international relations. The "Tragedy" of great power politics occurs when the power-maximization that nations pursue (which is almost mandated under international anarchy) leads to awesomely destructive hegemonic wars. Mearsheimer shatters the rhetoric surrounding great wars, reducing them to the basic elements of power. His theory is backed up by historical example, making for compelling reading. In addition, Mearsheimer looks to history and applies offensive realism in predicting that China will continue its rise and potentially challenge U.S. power in the near future.

Many will not agree with Mearsheimer's theory (this is the man, after all, who called for the nuclearization of Germany after the Cold War and pronounced NATO dead over a decade ago) but he is the leading Realist mind and strongest Realist voice in the IR community today. Love it or hate it, offensive realism does not get any more lucid than this.


Incredibly Unassailable Argument   February 18, 2006
RHW (Berkeley, CA)
17 out of 20 found this review helpful

First off, I'd like to say that I don't at all like Mr. Mearsheimer's thesis, nor the conclusions he draws. "Tragedy" is truly the perfect word to describe his theories. However, I have found the arguments to be so rock-solidly based on reality that I have had to put my feelings and opinions aside to accept the state of affairs that he brings forth.

Incredibly, his summarization of nearly 300 years of European history via the "offensive realism" lens explains many abberations throughout the history of human warfare. Most poignant of these is American involvement in WWII, coming as it did AFTER the near capitulation of all anti-German powers save Russia, effectively allowing Germany to crush any possible anti-American sentiment and resistance before American involvement was even an issue. I know a reviewer questioned why the US allowed Europe to exist as a separate political entity after the war, but if you take Mr. Mearsheimer's arguments that armies hold land belonging to the hegemonic power, then the question no longer exists. America's military reach has now expanded not just in Germany and Japan, but also in Korea, the Philippines, England, Turkey, Greece, Saudi Arabia, and recently Afghanistan and Iraq. If these armies constitute the "borders" of the American hegemony, then the only domains not completely covered are South America, Africa, parts of Central-South-East Asia, and most importantly, Russia/China -- everything else is under the American sphere of influence. This is exactly the point of Mr. Mearsheimer's theory - aggressive, hegemonic states such as America will not rest until all other threats are neutralized.

To explain why these satellite political entities (Europe, sections of the Middle-East, Japan and Korea) are allowed to exist despite over-arching American conventional/nuclear power, I point readers to Joseph Nye's book "The Paradox of American Power" as a supplement to Mr. Mearsheimer's book. Not only must civilizations be subject to the military might of the hegemon, they must also be allowed to economically participate and express via their own cultures their approval of America's dominant culture - or "soft power," as Mr. Nye puts it. Such "soft power" may explain why even though terrorists held a Korean hostage on world television and subsequently executed him after he begged and pleaded for his life, 3000 Korean troops left the next week for Iraq with nearly no political repercussions at America's request. How much clearer an example is needed of America's near hegemonic power over Korea's body politic? Is it that hard to compare this state of affairs to England, Germany, Japan, or even Saudi Arabia, and find similarities?

Another potent combination of these two theories may extend to the South-East Asian financial crisis and Long Term Capital Management. LTCM effectively destroyed economies surrounding China's coast along with Russia in what may be seen as an economic attack on the entire region, at the cost of a mere $100 billion bailout by private banks, or only 5% of the US government annual budget. The regions have since recovered, no doubt due to the resilience of one of the the intended targets: China, as evidence by CNOOC's strong challenge to Unocal's South-East Asian oil fields last year.

Mr. Mearsheimer's conclusion -- that despite America's isolationist and anti-war ideology and rhetoric, it still follows with amazing accuracy his theory of offensive realism --is self-evident when considering America's military reach, and the fact that America has the only effective nuclear arsenal capable of vaporizing all life on this planet, with no plans of diminishing this capability. America does not need to be accomodating in world politics, because America knows that it alone has the power to ensure it is the only one standing in any fight. Truly a pyrrhic victory, and truly a tragedy in the making.

This book, along with Mr. Nye's, is a must-read, not to feel good, but to feel informed of the current state of world politics. The most chilling aspect of Mr. Mearsheimer's argument is the historical precedence he continually illustrates to back his views. America may truly become what Germany, France, and England could not - a global hegemony.




The Flashlight in the Dark   October 9, 2001
38 out of 49 found this review helpful

As a former student of Professor Mearsheimer's, I was fairly familiar with many of the arguments he puts forward in this book. However, it is very gratifying to see finally his theory codified into a single volume, a Magnum Opus. Professor Mearsheimer's theory of "Offensive Realism" offers, without a doubt, the most comprehensive explanation for the behavior of Great Powers available to the student of international relations. While it does not explain everything in the world, it is like, in his own words, a powerful flashlight in a dark room, illuminating most of the room, but not every nook and cranny. However, given the profoundly pessimistic conclusions he reaches, many will wish to remain in the dark.

His theory is based on some very simple assumptions that really cannot be contested, such as anarchy, meaning the absence of an international police force that possesses the coercive wherewithal necessary to enforce rules of conduct among states, the desire to survive, and the uncertainty of intentions. From his basic assumptions, Professor Mearsheimer proceeds to discuss their implications for state behavior. His frighteningly rigorous logic leads to the conclusion that states must maximize their power vis-a-vis other states in order to survive. Therefore, the quest for security, which is, in reality, a quest for power, is a zero-sum game where the gains of one are always at the expense of another. States must aggressively seek power and expand whenever possible in order to assure their own survival. States that do not seek to maximize their power fall victim to those that do. Therein lies the "tragedy of great power politics." States must harm each other, not out of malice, but only because of the fear caused by the lack of physical security. This is a system that no one designed or intended. Unfortunately, it is not a system that we can leave or that is likely to be changed. The need for security overcomes any and all other considerations, such as ethics. How states seek to increase their security is also outlined. As much a historian as a political theorist, Professor Mearsheimer trolled through some two hundred years of history to provide ample evidence to support his theories as well as examples of their behaviors. The amount of historical evidence that he has marshaled for his work is staggering. It is this reliance on history that provides his theory with a credibility that one does not find in other works of international relations theory, especially those of the liberal schools. His work is more than a simple academic thought exercise in a vacuum, but rather one solidly grounded in reality.

Unfortunately, I do not believe his work will receive the credence that it deserves, despite the sound assumptions, powerful logic, and vast array of supporting historical evidence. I believe this because of the nature of his work and the method of his delivery. With an efficiency and rationality that borders on the ruthless, Professor Mearsheimer tears apart the halcyon pipedream held by many in the west, and lays bare the world, not as we would like it to be, but as it really is; a world where aggression is rewarded, where power matters, and where, in the words of Thomas Hobbes, force and fraud are the cardinal virtues. These are realities that are hard to accept. Professor Mearsheimer also makes no attempt to sugarcoat or palliate the harsh realities of the modern state system, using terms like "bleed them white" and "bait and bleed" to describe policies and strategies. People are accustomed to a peaceful world, where liberalism dominates and prosperity abounds, and are likely to blanch at the descriptions and especially the policy prescriptions found in this book, where aggressive warfare is a legitimate tool of statecraft and democracy has no special place or value. I imagine it will be difficult for most people to get past the harshness of the world as Professor Mearsheimer describes it, and may believe him to be a violent warmonger himself. This is, of course, completely wrong. His policy prescriptions are designed to improve the prospects of peace in light of the nature of the international system. While Professor Mearsheimer also provides clear explanations for the decades of peace that have been enjoyed in much of the world, most people will wish to reject them because they are based on the distribution of power. In addition to these fears, I have some particular disagreements with Professor Mearsheimer, but they are minute points and not ones that greatly oppose or disturb his overall theoretical framework. For example, I disagree with his use of GNP as the sole indicator of potential power. I would consider it to be an aspect of a composite index with, say energy consumption (which he uses earlier on) and total manufactured goods. I cannot stress enough my belief that this book is the most insightful and useful tool for understanding international politics available today, nor can I recommend this book strongly enough to anyone with an interest in world affairs or foreign policy.


Realism is back (with an offensive flavor)   December 8, 2001
8 out of 9 found this review helpful

It is widely assumed the world over that the end of the Cold War marked a new era - where the cynnical calculus of power politics will not apply and where the trading state will replace the warring the state. In short, many proclaim that interdependence (and globalization) forces states to cooperate and forgo relative gains. John Mearsheimer challenges this view. With his theory of 'offensive realism' he successfully shows that states are power-maximizers and the end of the Cold War did not change the anarchic nature of international politics. Nuclear weapons may have reduced the probability of war between the great powers, but great powers still try to maximize their share of power and this may very well lead to conflcit in the 21st century. (That the Great Powers are power maximizers is evident from the fact that the US plans to go ahead with the NMD and plans to develop an aerospace force - in the post-Cold War era without any systemic threats to US interests). There is no systemic proof for the liberal view that interdependence reduces the likelihood of war. In fact, globalization (with diffusion of technology and capital) will cause uneven growth rates around the world and will allow potential peers (China) to modernize and create wealth and ultimately challenge the leading power (US). In this book Mearsheimer shows that land power is still the dominant form of military power (even in the information age) and that states prefer buck-passing over balancing. This book is a must-read for all students and scholars in the fields of international relations and strategic studies. This book is in a league of its own and challenges among others Waltz's defensive realism (and supersedes it).