Oneself as Another | 
 enlarge | Author: Paul Ricoeur
Creator: Kathleen Blamey
Publisher: University Of Chicago Press
Category: Book
List Price: $21.00
Buy New: $14.58
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Rating:  2 reviews
Sales Rank: 242083
Media: Paperback
Pages: 374
Number Of Items: 1
Shipping Weight (lbs): 1.2
Dimensions (in): 9.1 x 6 x 1.1
ISBN: 0226713296
Dewey Decimal Number: 190
EAN: 9780226713298
Publication Date: January 1, 1995
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Product Description
Paul Ricoeur has been hailed as one of the most important thinkers of the century. Oneself as Another, the clearest account of his "philosophical ethics," substantiates this position and lays the groundwork for a metaphysics of morals.
Focusing on the concept of personal identity, Ricoeur develops a hermeneutics of the self that charts its epistemological path and ontological status.
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| Customer Reviews:
 Great book July 23, 2007
Sonho Kim (USA)
1 out of 3 found this review helpful
I am not in a position to evaluate this book. However, I think this book shows a nice attempt to theorize (?) the philosophy of the self or the first person beyond Cartesian cogito and metaphysical semantics, inviting readers to pay attention to pragmatics of the self. This book is a solid synthesis of many accomplishments in pragmatics, action theories, discursive psychology, and Russian dialogism. For that reason, it is hard to find author's original points. I would recommend to read/compare with Rom Harre's Singular Self.
 Subjecthood?? Subject positions?? Self-subjection?? June 24, 2003
12 out of 48 found this review helpful
As I understand it, the goal of Ricoeur's studies is to formulate a notion of the subject that is not susceptible to the same objections and aporia as Descartes's cogito. To accomplish this, he analyzes discursive situations and comes to the conclusion that the subject is first and foremost a being, i.e., a body in space, and that the subject understands herself first and foremost as such. Grammar reveals this self-objectivation (to borrow a term from Habermas) in that the reflexive "I" is a grammatical substitution for a corresponding third-person deictic term: "I" is the "she" of the speaking subject to the "he/him" is the "you" of the interlocutor as told from the perspective of the speaking subject, who occupies the same spatiotemporal point as the subject's particular body.
Ricoeur's findings appear rather plausible, but I cannot help but think that his findings imply sort of transcendental, or perhaps I should say, para- or transsubjective, awareness on the part of the subject that is inarticulable (neologism?) yet essential to her awareness as a body within a discursive situation. In other words, by virtue of the fact that the subject grammatically isolates herself differentially vis-a-vis her interlocutor in a discursive situation seems to me to imply that the subject's self-awareness is not as spatiotemporally limited as the body that it inhabits, or, more accurately with which it is coextensive (consubstantial?). I therefore remain uncertain on how prioritizing the corporeal subject before the thinking subject avoids the aporia of Cartesian subjectivity.
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